Despite many accurate details concerning the attack of LZ Russell, the editors of the LZ Russell web site are not convinced, at this time, that Col. Sexton’s article is a complete account.  As Colonel Degen states, in his communications concerning posting this article;

 “It is not a story about the attack on Russell, per se; however, it uses the attack on Russell to illustrate points about the tactics, techniques, and procedures which the NVA employed.”

This article will serve as an excellent example of the tactics used on Russell as well as providing our viewers with a general understanding of how the battle evolved.

On behalf of the entire LZ Russell Association, I would like to express our grateful appreciation to Lt. Colonel Carl Degen, USMC (Ret.) , one of LZ Russell’s outstanding members, for his efforts in gaining permission to publish this article on our web site.

I would also like to thank the Marine Corps Association and the staff of the Marine Corps Gazette for granting permission to publish this article.

Skip Poindexter, Webmaster

September 1969 edition, volume 53, number 9

 SAPPER ATTACK

By Col. M. J. Sexton

Complacency, boredom and routine must be avoided in Vietnam like the plague.  Alert aggressive opponents can overcome the most well planned sapper attack

It was 24 February, 1969; the day of the planned attack had arrived.  The objective had been painstakingly reconnoitered; detailed sketches made of all installations; natural and man-made obstacles plotted; mortar concentrations laid in, checked and rechecked; attack signal, password and signals for rally point and withdrawal memorized by all hands.  Every conceivable detail was worked out, down to and including sand table briefings and several rehearsals on terrain similar to that of the target area.  All was in readiness.

The attack forces moved out from their base camps at 0730, and using previously reconned routes executed a covered approach to final assembly areas.  At 1800 all attack groups were 100 meters from the concertina wire obstacles, which encircled the objective.  The time between 1800 and 0200, 25 February, was spent crawling to positions, which were just outside the defensive wire.  Promptly at 0200 the mortar sections commenced their accurate fires on previously selected primary targets within the enemy position.  The defender’s mortar positions, command bunker, communication bunkers and artillery positions were singled out for accurate and intense fires.  As the rounds were tubed, they could be heard by the defenders, and the incoming mortars were amazingly accurate.  Aside from the damage and noise and confusion caused by the increasing volume of mortar fire, the defenders were forced to go to their bunkers.  All positions had been painstakingly constructed for just such an eventuality.  All individual crew-served positions had been overheaded and bulwarked with at least four layers of sand bags.  The outboard defensive positions, or those that were on the perimeter, were not subjected to the same firepower as the key installations previously mentioned.  The majority of mortar fire was placed on the inboard positions.  The volume of fire increased as the gunners laid on previously observed and selected positions.  The defenders would later wonder about this particular point.  Why had not the perimeter positions, including the first line of passive obstacles and strong fortifications, been subjected to the same accurate mortar concentrations?  They had not been overlooked’ however, the rationale of the assaulting units was based on several very fundamental and essential military considerations. 

First, the so-called “key installations” were given the major attention.  That is, the Command Operations

Center (COC – the nerve center of the entire base); the mortar positions of the defenders; the ammunition bunkers; the Fire Direction Center; and the artillery battery.  The latter, of course, was the focus of the attention on the majority of the attacking elements; “hill top” artillery had proved to be one of the defender’s key tactical innovations, and one which he had used consistently and with surprising success. 

Secondly, the psychological factor of heavy volumes of fire being placed on key installations within the perimeter was a significant one.  Personnel on the perimeter could see and hear these fires, and there were undoubtedly those who were wondering when their turn would come.  It definitely contributed to a certain wariness and wonderment on their part.

Thirdly, under the cover of these fires, the assault elements made final preparations before breaching the fixed, defensive obstacles, rapidly penetrating all such outer defenses.  And manifestly, fires placed on the perimeter positions would have interfered with such preparations and caused casualties to certain assault elements.

At 0215, as the mortar concentrations reached a crescendo, the assault groups commenced their efforts to breach the defensive obstacles.  The initial assault wave came from the northeast and made liberal use of improvised bangalore torpedoes.  These had been fashioned from ½-pound blocks of TNT, locked together in a row between bamboo sticks.  The attack route lay trough one of the defender’s trash pits.  This proved to be an ingenious selection; there as a well-worn path from the dump to the defensive perimeter.  The mortar fire on the defensive position was augmented by machine gun sections and rifle grenades.  The dual effect of all these fires was a partial breaching of the defensive wire, and literally a deafening of a number of men on the defensive perimeter.  A major contributing factor to the latter state was the fact that the artillery battery on this position had been firing missions for several hours in direct support of another defensive position approximately eight thousand meters to the northwest.

The primary attack was executed by three main groups.  One was assigned the mission of assaulting and destroying the battery of facilities:  Fire Direction Center, ammunition pits and the artillery pieces themselves.   The second assault group was assigned the mission of assaulting and destroying the Command Operations Center and mortar positions.  The third group was to converge on the landing zone and juncture with the other assault units to effect a mop-up.  A fourth group was organized to function as an extraction force; this group was to assist in the withdrawal of those groups which assaulted the objective.  The fifth group was the base of fire, which provided the supporting mortar, machine gun and rifle fires.

What have been described up to this point are the basic preparations and commencement of an actual NVA sapper attack on a Marine fire support base near the DMZ.  A detailed examination, translation and analysis of documents found on the body of a sapper officer, within the perimeter, revealed the following organization of the primary assault elements:

GROUP I

· Strength - 16 men divided into four teams led by Comrade An

· 1st Team – 4 men to attack the CP

· 2nd Team – 4 men, attack to the right and link-up with Comrade Bong at LZ

· 3rd Team – Attack to the left, advance to the LZ and link up with Comrade Tan

· 4th Team – Attack to the front

· 5th & 6th Teams – Group reserve

GROUP II

· Strength – 15 Men, divided into four teams led by comrade Bong

· 1st Team – 4 men, attack and destroy Fire Direction Center

· 2nd Team – 4 men, attack artillery positions

· 3rd Team – 4 men, attack artillery positions

· 4th Team – 3 men, group reserve

GROUP III

· Strength – 12 men, led by Comrade Tam

· 1st Team – 3 men, attack artillery positions

· 2nd Team – three men, attack to the left, advance and link-up with Pha (another attack group)

· 4th Team – 3 men, group reserve

The planned entry points, directions of the attack of the major attack groups and their objectives are indicated in Figure 1.

Another factor, which aided the attackers, was the reduced visibility of the objective areas.  In addition to being a period when there was very little moonlight, a think blanket of fog enveloped the entire defensive positions and all the routes of ingress.

The attack continued until about 0530.  At that time, the Marines on the fire support base reorganized themselves and slowly, but methodically killed virtually all the enemy sappers who had penetrated the position.  There were innumerable incidents of uncommon valor as the battle ebbed and flowed. 

The officer-in-charge of the firebase found himself partially buried under a caved in bunker and as he crawled out he found himself face to face with one of the attackers.   The commander had a fragmentation grenade in his had, but he was too close to use it in its primary role.  Instead, he leaped on the NVA soldier and literally bludgeoned the shocked enemy soldier to death. 

The company gunnery sergeant dispatched several of the sappers in deadly hand-to-hand combat by using his personal knife as the primary weapon.  Marines from the 106mm section, who were originally manning a machine gun on the southeast fringes of the position, assaulted and killed six NVA soldiers who were attempting to organize a strong point inside the firebase.

During the period from 0410 to daylight, only one of the defender’s mortars remained in action.  However, the mortar squad stayed on the gun throughout, reestablished radio communications with the CO and fired a total of 380 rounds. 

As darkness gave way to the dawn, the defenders reestablished complete control of the firebase.  Throughout the fight, the company commander called for artillery fires to box in the positions.  A curtain of steel was brought in around the position from, the batteries located on mutually supporting firebases.  These fires were instrumental in preventing enemy reinforcement, or possible exploitation, and at the same time rendered the withdrawal of sappers at daylight a difficult task.

As the grimy, gutty Marines mopped up the battered firebase, they found a total of 24 NVA bodies inside the wire.  Reinforced patrols, later in the day and the following day, located one of the enemy assembly areas, which were strewn with bloody battle dressings.  Many drag marks were visible.  As daylight broke, the firebase resumed a normal posture.  All the guns in the artillery battery (less one temporarily out of action) were manned and ready.  The perimeter was reorganized and friendly casualties med-evaced.  As the resupply of helicopters flew into the firebase, the small American flag, flying on a makeshift staff, was visible for all to see.

There were, and are, many lessons to be learned from this classic sapper attack.  But the appreciation of standard NVA sapper tactics is fundamental to any discussion of lessons learned and counter measures.  After the announcement of the sapper company mission, the reconnaissance commences.  A period of three to seven days may be devoted to a detailed reconnoitering of the objective.  The terrain is minutely analyzed, defensive patterns are studied, all routes are carefully viewed, enemy positions noted and plotted, obstacles sketched and estimates made of the time required to breach the position.  In short, a detailed terrain analysis is made and terrain appreciation utilized in developing the plan of attack.

The period between the final reconnaissance and the commencement of the attack is allocated to briefings and rehearsals. Sand tables are prepared from sketches and each soldier is given precise instructions.

The attack itself is characterized by speed, firepower and shock.  The movement to the objective area is initiated may hours prior to the assault phase. This phase is characterized, in many instances, by what Marines term “creeping and crawling”. It is a basic assumption of the sappers that a majority of the defenders will be driven inside their bunkers by mortar fire.  Once this takes place, the RPGs and automatic weapons (of support force) open up on firing slits and ports.

The skilled sapper deliberately selects the most difficult avenue of approach, or one which offers the best opportunity for unobserved approach.  The use of the defender’s trash dumps is an excellent example of such a tactic.  As the mortar fires lift, RPGs, Chicom Grenades, satchel charges and bangalore torpedoes create the impression that the mortars are still firing.  The assault itself is made with utmost speed, attempting to keep the majority of defenders in their bunkers.  Mats, brush, or any local material are thrown across the wire and demolitions are used on particularly tough obstacles.

The primary objective of the sappers is to penetrate the defenses and inflict maximum casualties; destroy equipment, ordnance and installations, and withdraw.  This type of attack is not designed to occupy a position or to seize and hold a prominent terrain feature.

The major weakness in the tactics of the sapper is the requirement for time.  He must have time’ time to reconnoiter, time to plan, and time to rehearse.  This element, in turn, provides the force on the target list valuable time to prepare for such an attack.  If the unit is unimaginative and unaggressive, its fate is pre-ordained.  On the other hand, professionalism, hard work and ingenuity can contribute to the development of installations, which not only slow, but also crush such sapper attacks.

What can be done?

· The best defense for any base continues to be active patrolling, ambushes and listening posts outside the position.

· Since it is obvious from enemy plans and sketches that he is able to plan his attacks precisely, we must therefore present him with a continuously changing arrangement of our defenses.

· Periodic enemy incoming has led us to increased reliance on bunkers for protection.  Once ground action commences, these bunkers are death traps.  Hundreds of Marines enclosed in bunkers cannot stop even a small attack.  We need more fighting places and less hiding places.

· We need to experiment with all means of providing immediate alarm, some kind of illumination in fog, foolproof trip flares, increased use of tangle-foot barriers outside and inside the positions, and other methods for increasing the enemy’s difficulties.

· Employment of internal wire to compartmentalize positions and impede attacks in the event of outer perimeter defenses are breached.

· Use of fougasse, claymores, CS grenades, trip flares and other devices.

· Continual review and update of defensive plans to include defense in depth and employment of reaction forces.  Practice alerts must be conducted to test validity of plans.

· Random recon fire.

· Use of daylight H&I’s.

· Maximum use of night observation devices.

· Preparation and revision of local SOP.

· Consider the possibility of use of artificial moonlight.

· Alternate fighting holes and interconnecting trenches.

· Alternate communications plans and means

The foregoing checklist is only illustrative of a few of the actions that must be taken to combat the sapper threat.  Possible techniques and tactics are almost endless.  The point is that complacency; boredom and routine must be avoided like the plague.  If aggressiveness, ingenuity and professionalism are stressed, the sapper attack is doomed to failure – no matter how well planned, for in virtually any sapper attack, the sapper unit is outnumbered by his opponent.

 END

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