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RICHARD NIXON LIBRARY & BIRTHPLACE FOUNDATION

December 14, 2000

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Dear Mr. Poindexter,

Thanks for your gracious e-mail.  We’d enjoy being associated with the LZ Russell Association, and to have our web sites linked.  Please feel free to lift any graphics you like from our site. 

Attached is a memorandum from our documents specialist, Robert Nedelkoff, describing what he was able to find at the National Archives.  In the last paragraph you’ll find a suggestion for further inquiries.

 Good luck to you and your fellow members.  Let me know how we can be of service in the future.

 With best regards,

Sincerely,

After making a comprehensive search of all unclassified documents at the Nixon Project concerning the Vietnam War between February 15 and April 30, 1969, I was able to locate eight documents that either expressly referred to the attack on bas LZ Russell, or clearly referred to the group of North Vietnamese Army actions of which it was a part. (There are a large number of references in these documents to infringements and actions along the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ)) of Vietnam during February 1969 which are very general in nature and could be taken to refer to anything from the shelling of Hue at the beginning of the month to the NVA attacks at month’s end.)  These documents are all State Department cables which were found in Box 186 of the Nixon Project papers, which contains the National Security Council Files concerning the Paris peace negotiations for the first half of 1969.  Generally, they seem to be copies of documents that were cleared by the NSC, though their point of origin was elsewhere.  The cables are quoted in whole, or in part below, and are identified by the number assigned to them by the State Department and by date.

It is important to note that during the time of the NVA attack on LZ Russell took place, and during its immediate aftermath, President Nixon was overseas on a visit to Europe, primarily to address the North Atlantic Conference in Brussels, Belgium, but also to meet with the leaders of the United Kingdom, West Germany, Belgium, Denmark, Italy and France.  He also met with Pope Paul VI at Vatican City, and with South Vietnamese Vice President Nguyen Cao Ky when the latter was visiting Paris.  Secretary of state Rogers accompanied him on this trip.  On February 26, 1969, when the first of these memos was sent, the Presidential party was in London during the early morning and then flew to Cologne; on February 27, the Presidential party flew from West Berlin to Rome.  The President returned to Washington on March 2.

CABLE No. 1—State #029614. Sent from the State Department to Paris Peace Negotiations Delegation, Feb. 26, 1969; copy sent to Secretary of State Rogers via the American Embassy in London.  Drafted by J.R. Burke at the Vietnamese desk of the East Asian Bureau; transmission approved by John A. Calhoun of the East Asian Bureau.

The first paragraph of the cable concerns South Vietnamese Ambassador Bui Diem’s Conversation with State Department Personnel on February 25 regarding arrangements for Vice President Ky to meet with President Nixon in Paris.  The second paragraph reads:

“In the same conversation, Vui Diem speculated about current NVA/VC intentions in connection with the latest series of attacks.  He feels that Hanoi is carefully and deliberately probing in an effort to test the new administration.  He expects attacks to go on intermittently for the next two or three weeks.”

Succeeding paragraphs concern Bui Diem’s opinions on the other aspects of war.

CABLE NO. 2—State #31460.  Subject:  Vietnam Situation Report.  Sent from State Department to Secretary Rogers via the American Embassy in Rome, February 27, 1969.  Drafted by H. Isham and R. Gibson at the Vietnamese desk of the East Asian Bureau’ transmission approved by J.A. Calhoun at East Asian Bureau; cleared by J.R. Burke at East Asian Bureau; Mr. Walsh at Secretary of State’s Office.

The first paragraph of this cable concerns the various diplomatic initiatives.  The second paragraph reads:

“Post-Tet Offensive:  The enemy offensive which began in the early morning hours of February 23 with a high degree of coordination appeared to taper off sharply on the night of February 26-27.  However, intelligence indicated that the enemy may be preparing to follow up within the next day or so with a new phase of activity featuring more ground attacks against Allied installations.  There are no clear indications of enemy intentions with regard to Saigon city. [A brief discussion of the possibility of enemy actions in Saigon area follows.]  Although there have been attacks against population centers, the preponderance of enemy effort has been directed against Allied military installations, the most significant having been the attack on the US Long Binh/Bien Hoa complex.  The decline in enemy-initiated activity which was evident on the 26th continued early February 27 with few reports of significant contacts anywhere in South Vietnam.  Small-scale ground actions of indiscriminate shellings are continuing.  The most intense of the latter was a concentration of 300 mortar and recoilless rifle rounds on an outpost in the 3rd Corps Tactical Zone.  Local forces and guerillas continue to carry out the major portion of the recent activity.  However, probable participation by elements of the NVA regiments in some recent actions may signal the enemy’s intention to employ main force units against strategic military civilian targets.

“Most recent KIA totals for the 48 hours starting midnight February 23 (Saigon time) are estimated to be approximately;

US                 272

Vietnamese   533

Free World        4

Enemy         4900.”

CABLE No. 3—State #41208  Todel (Copy To Paris Delegation) #2364.  Subject: Situation in DMZ Area.  Sent from the State Department to the American Embassy in Saigon, March 17, 1969.  Drafted by C. C. Flowerree at East Asian Bureau; transmission approved by William Bundy of East Asian Bureau.  Cleared by the Ad Hoc Group on Vietnam.

“1) Situation in DMZ area is, as you can appreciate, of growing interest and concern here.  We are particularly anxious to get as much as possible of story of enemy buildup and recent activity within and from DMZ area on public record at an appropriate time.  Reftel summarized releasable info available to us as of March 11.

“2) We would appreciate Mission’s taking urgent new reading on DMZ giving; 1) Your assessment of the situation based on information from all sources, and 2) what can be said to clarify publicly the nature of recent enemy violations of DMZ and magnitude of threat.  Specifically, we would like to have a wrap-up from you in the next couple of days which would form the basis for a backgrounder or public statement at the appropriate time, whether here and/ore in Saigon or Paris.”

CABLE No. 4—State #43998, Todel #2397.  Sent from State Department to American Embassy in Saigon, March 21, 1969.  Drafted by L. G. Sarris and D. Keogh of the Office of the Secretary of State.  Cleared by C. C. Flowerree at East Asian Bureau and by John Holdridge of NSC Staff.

 “1) Detailed information contained in Ref. B most useful.  It is comprehensive and covers all sources.

“2) Would be most helpful here if you could use this information to prepare general draft of backgrounder or public statement for our review and consideration among Washington agencies.  Believe that you are in a better position in Saigon than we are here to judge level of DMZ violations and their military significance.  In our opinion main forces should probably be on 1) significant violations of DMZ, e.g. intrusion in recent weeks of elements such as major NVA units as 27th, 246th and 82nd. 2) major actions they initiated, e.g. attacks on V5 Fire Support Base Russell and Neville; and 3) threat that these units now pose to US Forces in northern I Corps.  Supporting collateral evidence on these units cited Ref. B is sufficient.

 “3) We realize of course that there is additional evidence from other special intelligence services which we cannot use but which may be very helpful in identifying elements of other units entering DMZ or concentrating immediately to the north.  Would appreciate from you some suggestion on how best to handle this problem publicly and within reasonable security limitations.”

CABLE No. 5—State #046288, Todel #2416.  Subject: Draft U.S. Statement for the 10th Plenary Sessions of Paris Talks, to be held March 27[1969].  Sent from State Department to American Embassy in Paris, March 25, 1969.  Drafted by H. Isham of Vietnamese Desk of East Asian Bureau; transmission approved by J. A. Calhoun of East Asian Bureau.  Cleared by Adm. Epes at Joint Chiefs of Staff, and by Richard Sneider at the White House.  Cover sheet indicates copy of cable was sent to Dr. Henry A. Kissinger at his White House office, and subsequently cleared by Gen. Alexander Haig, Jr. 

“1) We have reviewed you excellent statement for factual accuracy and find that your specific figures as modified by Ref. B conforms with those held by DIA and INR.  We do have some suggested changes in language.  We also concur with other changes suggested Ref. B.

[The second paragraph suggested rewording of the sentence concerning deployment of North Vietnamese troops in Laos.]

“3) We also believe that additional specific references to NVA presence and activities would strengthen the statement.  We suggest that some reference might be included, for example to the attacks on U.S. Fire Support Bases Neville and Russell in northern I Corps by the NVA 27th and 246th Regiments (see State #04398, Todel 2397).”

 [It should be noted that the suggested reference did not appear, with the suggested specificity, in the final draft of the plenary statement, though a reference was made in general terms to the NVA actions in the area of the DMZ.]

CABLE No. 6—Control #8788Q.  Sent from the American Embassy in Saigon to State Department on April 1, 1969 [Saigon time], received march 31 [Washington time].  Signed by [first name unknown] Berger.

“Ref: State #43998.

“1) Following is a draft of text for backgrounder on public Statement on DMZ situation.

“2) There were major contacts near the DMZ during the week of 22 February—1 March, 1969

[There follows a breakdown, week by week, for the period from January 1 to March 25, 1969, of the number of enemy personnel estimated to be in the DMZ.]

 “4) In addition, elements of the 27th and 246th NVA regiments, known to have been North of the DMZ as late as January, have been identified in several attacks against Allied installations on 25 February immediately south of the DMZ.”

 [Entries from notebooks kept by captured NVA officers are cited to establish the movement of NVA troops.]

CABLE No. 7—Control #8789.  Sent from the American Embassy in Saigon to State Department on April 1, 1969.  Signed by [first name unknown] Berger.

The second paragraph of this cable, an addendum to the previous message, states in subsection f): “Elements of the 246th NVA regiment were identified in the 25 February attack against Fire Support Base Neville.”  Fire Support Base Russell is not referred to in the cable.

CABLE No. 8—State #52367, Todel #2478.  Subject:  Situation in DMZ.  Sent from State Department to the American Embassy in Saigon on April 4, 1969.  Drafted by C. C. Flowerree at East Asian Bureau; Cleared by Gen. Alexander Haig at National Security Council, Adm. Epes at Department of Defense, Deen Moor at White House.

“1) After reviewing text provided in reftel we have come to the conclusion that releasing statement along these lines of scheduling backgrounder drawing on information provided would accomplish little at the time.

 “2) Our initial interest in stimulating preparation of publicly releasable data on the DMZ situation was sparked by indications a few weeks ago that the enemy activity might take the form of major operations in and through the DMZ.  Subsequent developments have not borne out this expectation.  In fact, we find that material which can be released publicly is so thin that it might actually create the impression that enemy is restraining his activity in and through the DMZ.

 “3) With these considerations in mind, we have decided against making any detailed statement on this subject, for the time being.  However, we would like you to continue to gather additional data against the time when circumstances may make a public statement or backgrounder useful in supporting our policy objectives.”

That is the extent of the documents in the Nixon Project archives concerning LZ Russell, or the actions related to it that were unclassified and available to me.  John Powers of the Nixon Project has advised me that further records pertaining to LZ Russell, which would be in the nature of military communications not necessarily forwarded to the White House, may be among the military records of the Archives.

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